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Intersex is one of several contested umbrella terms used to 
describe physical characteristics that render a person’s 
embodiment different from normative or typical defini-
tions of male and female bodies. Other terms used in this 
arena include “Variations in Sex Characteristics” (or VSC, 
Government Equalities Office, England and Wales, 2019), 
disorders of sex development (or DSDs, Lee et al., 2006), 
and differences of sex development (see Delimata et al., 
2018 on experts’ current disagreements, and Lundberg 
et al. (2018) on laypeople’s understandings of such 
“umbrella terms”). Since the 19th century, clinical medi-
cine has been the dominant discipline which has adjudi-
cated questions about what constitutes intersex and how 
intersex people should be treated in society (Dreger, 2000; 
Reis, 2009). Psychological rationales for the medical 
“normalization” of intersex characteristics, particularly 
surgeries in infancy, were pressed with greater urgency in 
the middle of the 20th century. In that context, by drawing 
on the cybernetics and animal psychology of his time, the 
psychologist John Money prescribed infant genital surger-
ies to enhance both infants’ identification with assigned 
genders, and to enable parent–child bonding (Gill-Peterson, 
2018; Morland, 2015). These interventions became more 
common as advances in pediatric endocrinology allowed 
cortisol injections to save the lives of infants born with 
congenital adrenal hyperplasia (CAH). Infants with XX 
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Abstract
Human rights statements on intersex characteristics distinguish legitimate “medically necessary” interventions from 
illegitimate normalizing ones. Ironically, this binary classification seems partially grounded in knowledge of anatomy and 
medical interventions; the very expertise that human rights statements challenge. Here, 23 European health professionals 
from specialist “disorder of sex development” (DSD) multidisciplinary teams located medical interventions on a continuum 
ranging from “medically essential” to nonessential poles. They explained their answers. Participants mostly described 
interventions on penile/scrotal, clitoral/labial, vaginal, and gonadal anatomy whose essential character was only partially 
grounded in anatomical variation and diagnoses. To explain what was medically necessary, health care professionals drew 
on lay understandings of child development, parental distress, collective opposition to medicalization, patients “coping” 
abilities, and patients’ own choices. Concepts of “medical necessity” were grounded in a hybrid ontology of patients with 
intersex traits as both physical bodies and as phenomenological subjects. Challenges to medical expertise on human rights 
grounds are well warranted but presume a bounded and well-grounded category of “medically necessary” intervention that 
is discursively flexible. Psychologists’ long-standing neglect of people with intersex characteristics, and the marginalization 
of clinical psychologists in DSD teams, may contribute to the construction of some controversial interventions as medically 
necessary.
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genotype and CAH were the largest, and best researched, 
diagnostic group who experienced the kinds of “normaliz-
ing” infant surgeries promoted by John Money’s protocols, 
which went uncontested in clinical medicine into the 1980s 
(Kessler, 1990).
In the 1990s, diverse challenges from the social sci-
ences (Kessler, 1998), patient advocacy (Chase, 1998), 
medical ethics (Dreger, 1998), and revelations of fraud in 
Money’s research and ethical abuse in his clinical prac-
tices (see Colapinto, 2001) all cast considerable doubt on 
the legitimacy of long-dominant protocols in this other-
wise isolated medical specialism (see also Davis, 2015). 
Skepticism regarding Money’s hypothesis that any child 
could adopt any gender identity to which they are assigned 
in infancy led many to call for a blanket ban on early sur-
gical interventions (Diamond & Sigmundson, 1997). With 
their legitimacy challenged, medical interventions on 
intersex became subject to sharper thinking about which 
were genuinely vital, or had well-evidenced health bene-
fits, and which had been—problematically—conducted 
only to “normalize” physical appearance with dubious 
rationales, and often without clear informed consent (see 
e.g., Frader et al., 2004, p. 427). The Intersex Society of 
North American (ISNA) pushed for a patient-centered 
approach to replace paternalistic medicine, focused on open 
communication, consent, the avoidance of unnecessary 
interventions, and the acknowledgment of psychosocial 
need and risk.
The growth of intersex advocacy groups in the 1990s 
not only led to a critique of existing protocols by giving 
voice to the harms they had caused, it also allowed “inter-
sex” to become a social identity category with which some 
people began to identify in some situations (Preves, 2003). 
However, social psychological understanding of how peo-
ple with intersex characteristics navigate social contexts 
marked by stigma was, and remains, limited. Instead, in 
a long history of dehumanizing and instrumentalizing 
research, women and girls with CAH, were positioned as 
“natural experiments” to satisfy scientific curiosity about 
nature/nurture issues (See Ellis, 1945; Money & Ehrhardt, 
1972, for early arguments). Even into the 21st century, 
psychologists studied women and girls with CAH for few 
reasons other than to discover their adult sexual identities 
and gender role behaviors, with little regard for the impact 
of life events or individuals’ responses to such events 
(Stout et al., 2010). Ignorance of psychosocial and psy-
chosexual impact of medicalization was so profound that 
it was only in the 21st century that studies empirically 
demonstrated that “normalizing” clitoral surgery in 
infancy impacted adult psychosexual functioning (Crouch 
et al., 2008; Minto et al., 2003).
In pediatrics, the field defining “Chicago Consensus 
Statement” responded to these epistemological and moral 
controversies (Lee et al., 2006). This consensus statement 
grounded diagnostic concepts in genetics in ways that 
would have been unimaginable by John Money in the 
1950s, when many phenotypic variations were known, but 
genotypic understanding was limited (Gill-Peterson, 2018; 
Griffiths, 2018b). Georgiann Davis (2015) describes the 
“chicago consensus statement” as a move to reground 
intersex within the terms of medical authority. It projected 
an ideal of certainty and of good medical practice that 
might address some evident concerns, but subsequent 
research has suggested that it did not end controversy on 
several important points (Liao & Roen, 2014).
First, the Chicago consensus recommended that the term 
“disorders of sex development” be used in preference to 
“intersex” or other terms on the grounds that the term DSD 
was clearer and less pejorative. However, these claim are 
troubled by continuing controversies between medical spe-
cialists as to whether DSD refers primarily to genetic or 
anatomical variation (see Griffiths, 2018b), social research 
showing that affected young people and their carers use a 
range of language terms in everyday contexts, other than 
DSD (e.g., Lundberg et al., 2019), and a 10-year update to 
the consensus statement which found continuing expert dis-
agreement about why the DSD might be problematic 
(Delimata et al., 2018). This lack of coherence may result 
from the fact that “DSD” is often understood to be an 
Aristotelean category with clear biological referents, but is 
often deployed as a goal-directed category, describing a 
range of ways that medical interventions and diverse bodies 
can, with some optimism, be brought together (Thorne & 
Hegarty, 2019).
Second, while the consensus described the goal of medi-
cal intervention in patient-centered terms, medical practice 
has not changed substantively in some areas. While the 
Chicago consensus acknowledged the harms of infant clito-
ral surgeries, only some teams self-reported a reduction in 
rates of these surgeries in its wake (Pasterski et al., 2010) 
and national statistics in some countries show no clear 
reductions over the long run (Creighton et al., 2014, see also 
Mouriquand et al., 2016; Wolffenbuttel & Crouch, 2014). 
Chicago also acknowledged a lack of evidence for Money’s 
assumption that surgical interventions would enhance 
parent–child bonds, and endowed parents with greater 
authority in medical decision making. Several qualitative 
studies have shown that the obligations of decision making 
remains profoundly distressing for parents, and are often 
rushed in medical practice (Roen, 2019). Even when health 
care professionals seem to advocate delaying interventions, 
their arguments for delay can be unclear (Liao et al., 2019) 
and their presentation of medical interventions in positive 
terms can sway parents’ decisions (Timmermans et al., 
2018). Davis’ (2015) claim that Chicago was an attempt to 
reimpose medical authority seems borne out by the 
increased funding for biomedical research on DSD follow-
ing Chicago (Sandberg et al., 2015).
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These diverse and partial effects of the Chicago consen-
sus statement explain why advocates have adopted diverse 
goals and strategies in different organizations and move-
ments since its publication. One broadening counter- 
consensus describes how current medical management, 
prototypically infant surgeries, places human rights in jeop-
ardy, particularly children’s rights to bodily autonomy and 
self-determination (Carpenter, 2016; Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights, 2019). Informed by 
advocacy groups who remained critical of Chicago after 
2006, such as Organization Intersex International, global 
human rights bodies have increasingly researched ongoing 
medical practice and added their voices to challenging its 
ongoing legitimacy. A second strategy of medical activism 
operated by placing activists on decision-making bodies to 
change guidelines and to bring about change to democratize 
decision making about both clinical care and research direc-
tions (see Davis, 2015; Sudai, 2019). The present article 
aims to inform general psychologists about what their 
medical colleagues might be doing in this contested space. 
We aim to draw psychology closer to the question of what 
people with intersex characteristics, and those who support 
their flourishing, might hope to gain from current human 
rights movements, and their statements about which 
medical practices particularly need to be prohibited to pro-
tect infants’ human rights. While legal scholar Tanya Ni 
Mhuirthile’s (2010) notes that people with intersex charac-
teristics might hope for less from the exercise of prohibitive 
law, than appears to be the case, Sudai (2019) argues law 
can both reground questions on fundamental principles of 
justice and value and that law remains critical to challeng-
ing professional norms in this area of medicine.
Human rights documents do not position all possible 
medical interventions on intersex characteristics as infringing 
human rights. Rather they construct two classes of interven-
tions whose differing necessity undergirds their different 
legitimacy as practices that need to continue and practices 
that the law must prohibit. An agreed-upon limit of the 
exercise of legal prohibition in this area is the category of 
legitimate “medically necessary” interventions on intersex 
characteristics that might, or even should, be performed to 
protect human rights. This category is conceptualized some-
what differently in different documents. For example, a 
2015 United Nations factsheet declared that states should rec-
ognize the risk of abuse engendered by “unnecessary surgery 
and treatment on intersex children” that is performed without 
consent (emphasis added). Similarly, Parliamentary Assembly 
of the Council of Europe Resolution 1952 (2013) calls on 
member states to guarantee bodily integrity by forbidding 
treatments that are “cosmetic rather than vital for health dur-
ing infancy or childhood” (emphasis added). In 2015, the EU 
Fundamental Rights Agency described irreversible interven-
tions that impose sex on babies and toddlers as “cosmetic 
rather than medically essential” (emphasis added). Also in 
2015, Malta prohibited “any sex assignment treatment and/or 
surgical intervention on the sex characteristics of a minor” 
and is often described as the first country to ban surgical 
interventions (Malta, 2015). However, even the Maltese law 
allowed parents to consent to interventions in “exceptional 
circumstances” as long as they are not “driven by social 
factors.” Similar dichotomies can be found in Amnesty 
International’s (2017, p. 26) report on medical practices in 
Germany and Denmark which exemplified the category of 
the “clear medical necessity for surgery” using the example 
of a urogenital sinus. Research by Human Rights Watch 
(2017, p. 95) in the United States pointed to “the removal of 
cancerous gonads” to exemplify “intersex conditions that do, 
indisputably, require surgical intervention.”
A detailed description of this category is in Bill 201 of 
the California Senate (2019) which defines necessity as rea-
sonable, necessary to protect life, prevent significant illness 
or disability, or alleviate severe pain, to address a risk of 
cancer significantly greater than that in the population, can-
not be safely deferred until informed consent is possible, 
cannot be based on “psychological factors,” follows from 
consent that does not discuss risks and alternatives. The 
United Nations (2015, p. 10) has also reasserted the distinc-
tion between nonurgent interventions that are “invasive or 
irreversible” which bring “high potential for, and evidence 
of, harm” from those “essential for physical health, such as 
when an infant is unable to urinate, or unable to retain salt.” 
The Yogyakarta + 10 principles assert, in relation to sex 
characteristics, that “No one shall be subjected to invasive or 
irreversible medical procedures that modify sex characteris-
tics without their free, prior and informed consent, unless 
necessary to avoid serious, urgent and irreparable harm to 
the concerned person” (Yogyakarta Principles, 2017). 
In sum, human rights bodies do not call for complete 
cessation of all interventions but include grounds for con-
ceptualizing interventions as necessary if they are vital, 
essential, exceptional, reversible, noninvasive, unlikely to 
harm, and are nonessential if they are cosmetic, appear-
ance-based, normalizing, or driven by social factors. There 
are variable ways of constructing line between allowable 
necessary and immoral practices in human rights docu-
ments, and those lines can rest on current medical expertise 
to a variable degree. Who else, other than a medical profes-
sional, can be trusted to judge when an infant’s body does or 
does not put that infant’s own life at risk? As such, human 
rights documents adopt an ambivalent stance toward medi-
cal professionals in DSD teams. On one hand, those teams 
are guilty of human rights abuses and, on the other hand, 
they possessing unique expertise that sets the limits of the 
human rights critique of their practices. In the United States, 
DSD health care professionals have been observed to use 
this conceptual ambiguity to exercise their clinical judg-
ment when they advise parents of infants with intersex traits 
in practice (Timmermans et al., 2018).
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To better understand how expert health care profession-
als in DSD teams might respond to this complex positioning 
of their expertise, we examined empirically here how they 
demarcate medical interventions that are essential from 
those which are not. Both cognitive and discursive psychol-
ogists have good reason to anticipate that the morally laden 
dichotomy in human rights documents and in emerging law 
might be simpler than health care professionals’ reasoning 
about interventions that their teams can enact. Humans 
think with categories that have fuzzy boundaries, internal 
structures that vary depending on the goals they are con-
structed to pursue, and which are represented by character-
istics or exemplars in different contexts (see e.g., Barsalou, 
1983; Medin, 1989; Rosch & Mervis, 1975). Categorization 
is also social, and humans rarely categorize other humans 
just for the sake of it, but quite often do so to impose cultur-
ally specific, morally laden forms of social orders on more 
messy forms of reality (Douglas, 1966). In practice, this 
often requires switching between different modes of cate-
gorization, as when diagnostic reasoning involves both rea-
soning with exemplars (cases) and formal definitions 
(Bowker & Starr, 1999; Croskerry, 2009). Human rights 
documents exemplify this flexibility in categorical con-
struction, drawing on both characteristics (such as neces-
sity), exemplars (such as a urogenital sinus), and background 
norms (against which extremity is conceptualized) in their 
discourse. Such thinking may be characterized by “the illu-
sion of explanatory depth”; people reason as if their catego-
ries had clear ontological grounding, which emerges as 
illusionary when those categories require explicit explana-
tion (Hampton, 2010).
We examined whether DSD professionals found them-
selves challenged by unexpected dilemmas when called 
upon to “draw the line” regarding essential medical inter-
ventions. Qualitative studies have often described health 
care professionals as voicing rationales for medical inter-
vention that go beyond the interests of people with intersex 
characteristics themselves (Karkazis, 2008; Kessler, 1990). 
Interventions can be understood by health care profession-
als as benevolent, sometimes because they are grounded in 
an understanding of normative embodiment as providing a 
shelter from stigma and shame or merely in avoiding paren-
tal distress (e.g., Binet et al., 2016). The bioethicist Ellen 
Feder (2014) has argued that human rights can not only be 
conceptualized as lying within bounded individual subjects, 
but may exist in relationships, between parents and children 
for example. Peck and Feder (2017) have also urged consid-
eration of how health care professionals in DSD teams may 
commit institutional evils—not out of conscious intent—
but rather out of the failure to consider and challenge insti-
tutional norms which may reasonably be foreseen to bring 
about intolerable harms. Parents often chose interventions 
for their children in medical practice, when those interven-
tions are made available to them (Ellens et al., 2017; 
Timmermans et al., 2018). Vulnerability to human rights 
abuse emerges at the intersection of familial and organiza-
tional socialities.
Human rights statements make health care professionals 
vulnerable to charges that they are enacting torture, or other 
cruel, inhumane and degrading treatment or punishment 
against which appeals to benevolent intent do not offer a 
sustained defense. The best wishes in the world for children 
to escape stigma, and for their parents’ distress to be eased, 
are not grounds for medical interventions by contemporary 
human rights standards. Responding to their own context of 
contested authority, health care professionals, like others in 
argumentative contexts, may be expected to draw on differ-
ent ontological grounds for particularizing and generalizing 
from instances to position the line between medical neces-
sity and non-necessity (Billig, 1987). Again, cognitive 
research would suggest that they might do so by more 
clearly articulating how patients are vulnerable because 
they differ from social norms for embodiment, develop-
ment, and identity, such that it is easiest to imagine muta-
tion in the direction of normativity (Kahneman & Miller, 
1986). To the extent that reasoning does draw upon such 
“blind spots” regarding what is assumed as normative, 
health care professionals’ understandings of the medically 
necessary, may be linked to structural oppression regarding 
sex and gender (Peck & Feder, 2017, p. 214).
When Mendez (2013) clarified, in his role as the U.N. 
Special rapporteur on Torture, that the United Nations 
understood that torture did not require harmful intent, he 
did so at a time when the American Psychological 
Association (APA) Code of Ethics called on psychologists 
to end torture in all of its manifestations (APA, 2002). 
Clinical psychologists’ inclusion in DSD multidisciplinary 
teams is described by the 2006 Chicago consensus state-
ment as material to ethical decision making and patient and 
parent well-being. The 2015 Hoffman report on collusion of 
the APA with torture carried out by the U.S. Department of 
Defense in Guantanamo has made clear that the 2002 APA 
Code of Ethics was written to allow psychologists who 
experienced conflict between professional ethical obliga-
tion and a law or order to ethically follow the law or order. 
Hoffman et al. (2015) concluded that the writing of this 
ethical standard into the 2002 APA Code was a consequence 
of collusion between actors in the APA and the U.S. 
Department of Defense. Torture had been defined restric-
tively by the U.S. Department of Defense after the September 
11th attacks in 2001. However, Hoffman et al. (2015) also 
included that there had been no deliberate intention to afford 
psychologists’ active involvement in interrogations involv-
ing torture techniques in Guantanamo in the writing of the 
2002 Ethics Code.
The relationship between the definition of torture in psy-
chologists’ professional ethics and the more recent attribu-
tion of torture to the medical interventions conducted in 
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multidisciplinary DSD teams has not been addressed before. 
In various public statements prior to the Hoffman et al. 
Report (2015), the APA reaffirmed its commitment to prin-
ciples of opposing torture under international human rights 
law and to the authority of the office on the U.N. Special 
Rapporteur on Torture in deciding what is and what is not 
“torture” (APA, n.d.). Consequently, one understanding of 
the current landscape would be that clinical psychologists, 
who are often made peripheral in multidisciplinary DSD 
teams (See Liao & Roen, 2019), may collude with torture in 
medicalized environments, while acting in good faith for 
patient benefit. Clarifying how health care professionals 
ground the medical necessity of their practices may thus be 
of broad ethical concern for general psychologists.
The Present Study
Here, we analyzed how health care professionals might, 
when pressed to do so, “draw the line” between different 
interventions that vary in their necessity. We draw on inter-
views that were conducted as part of the SENS project, 
which includes the in-depth and systematic investigation of 
how young people, parents, and carers, DSD health care 
professionals, and laypeople make sense of differences of 
sex development and their medicalization. SENS data was 
collected in four European countries; Scotland, England, 
Norway and Sweden. Three previous publications, drawing 
on these interviews with health care professionals in this 
corpus have examined how these DSD health care provid-
ers make sense of continuing interventions on the vagina 
(Roen et al., 2018), the penis (Roen & Hegarty, 2018), and 
the clitoris (Liao et al., 2019). Consistent themes emerged 
from these analyses. DSD health care professionals (a) 
wrestle with dilemmas between historical warrants and 
recent challenges to particular medical interventions, (b) are 
often unaware of the performative effects of their discourse 
in framing available interventions as necessary ones, and 
(c) do very little to challenge patients and parents’ received 
norms about what “normal” bodies are or can do. The pres-
ent analysis focuses on how medical necessity is conceptu-
alized and talked up across all possible interventions and 




The U.K. National Health Service and a U.K. University 
Ethics Committee approved this study. The last author used 
snowball sampling recruitment methods, supported by the 
fourth and fifth authors’ networks, to interview 32 U.K. and 
Swedish health professionals working with or in multidisci-
plinary DSD teams. Early in those interviews, she presented 
a 3,500 mm horizontal line with ends marked as “medically 
necessary” and “cosmetic.” Her interview protocol read as 
follows:
The distinction between interventions that are medically 
essential, and interventions that are helpful for improving 
appearance (i.e., cosmetic interventions) may be seen differently 
by different people. Can you tell me about what kinds of 
interventions you would describe as medically essential 
interventions or interventions that are helpful for improving 
appearance? If these are the endpoints on a continuum, what 
kinds of interventions would you describe as lying along the 
continuum?
This paper-based task was not carried out in six telephone 
interviews. Two further interviewees choose not to mark the 
paper but talked about the idea of the continuum presented. 
Another replaced the diagram with a three-pronged radial 
diagram labeled “necessary,” “appearance,” and “family.” 
These three responses evidence that a binary distinction, or 
even a continuum, between essential versus cosmetic inter-
ventions is not the natural or immediate way for these health 
care professionals to conceptualize what their teams do. 
The analysis here draws on the responses of the remaining 
23 interviewees who responded to our challenge to place 
their team’s interventions on this line; six urologists, four 
endocrinologists, three psychologists, three geneticists, 
three gynecologists, two pediatric surgeons, and two nurse 
specialists. Even within this sample, a further two strongly 
suggested alternative diagrams to better represent multidi-
mensional spaces that included “family” “reconstructive,” 
“functional,” or “psychosocial” interventions more explic-
itly. Diagrams were retained and interviews were audio-
recorded and transcribed.
Placing Interventions Along the Line
We interpreted the 3,500 mm line as a 101-point scale 
ranging from 0 (nonessential) to 100 (medically essential). 
Interviewees made 2 to 15 legible marks each (M = 6.82), 
to a total of 157 such responses. Responses were widely 
distributed around the scale’s midpoint, M = 53.3, SD = 
32.5. One response positioned beyond the “nonessential” 
end was scored as 0. The first author read and reread 
the sections of interview transcripts where participants 
explained their responses. A two-tier system for categoriz-
ing the interventions emerged. Interventions were framed 
in discourse primarily by reference to the site, the goal, or 
the targeted group of the interventions. Second, responses 
were subdivided by the distinct sites, goals, or groups 
addressed. Table 1 displays the number and proportion of 
interviewees making responses in each subtype and their 
range on the continuum. As it shows, participants most 
commonly conceptualized these interventions in terms of 
the site that they targeted, consistent with a grounding of 
interventions primarily in the natural facts of bodily varia-
tion with goals and diagnoses being secondary.
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Table 1. Number, Mean, and Range of Locations of Medical Interventions on 100-Point Scale and Number and Percentage of Health 
Professionals who Mentioned Them by Site, Function, and Group (0 = Not Essential, 100 = Medically Essential).
Interventions mentioned Health professionals
 N M Range N % of sample
Site:
 Penis/scrotum 24 44.8 (0–92) 14 60.8
 Clitoris/labia 15 26.5 (0–82) 11 47.8
 Vagina/uterus 24 52.1 (0–96) 9 39.1
 Gonads/hormones 13 77.3 (31–96) 10 43.4
 Others 7 62.1 (12–99) 5 21.7
 All sites 83 50.1 (0–99) 19 82.6
Function:
 Diagnostic 9 76.1 (30–93) 5 21.7
 Endocrine 8 72.0 (26–90) 7 30.4
 “Function” 11 50.2 (0–85) 8 34.8
 Psychosocial 11 49.7 (3–100) 8 34.8
 Sex/gender 7 25.1 (6–47) 7 30.4
 Appearance 3 16.1 (0–45) 3 13.0
 All functions 49 52.7 (0–100) 15 65.2
Group:
 CAH/46 XX DSD 16 67.7 (5–100) 11 47.8
 Age-specific 3 66.6 (17–100) 2 8.7
 Turner’s 4 55.6 (14–94) 2 8.7
 AIS 1 47.3 — 1 4.3
 All groups 24 64.7 (5–100) 12 52.1
Note. Scores Range from 0 “Nonessential” to 100 “Medically Essential.” CAH = congenital adrenal hyperplasia; DSD = disorder of sex development;  
AIS = androgen insensitivity syndrome.
The first author extracted the talk about each subtype as 
the first step in the thematic analysis (Braun & Clarke, 
2006). Systematic overlap in the contents of subtheme led 
to the decision to conduct the present analysis which is ori-
ented around the sites of intervention. Published analysis of 
clinician’s talk from the entire interviews about the inter-
vention on the first three of these sites have been published 
as noted above. We reference those papers in the analysis 
below so that we can examine how the category of “medical 
necessity” emerges across interventions rather than only in 
regard to interventions targeting a particular anatomical 
characteristic.
Four preliminary observations preface this analysis and 
frame the forms of categorization that health care profes-
sionals attempted here. First, cognitive psychologists have 
long known that the most prototypical instances of any cat-
egory are called to mind quickly and with greatest fre-
quency (Rosch & Mervis, 1975). The clearest example of 
the “prototype” of a medically necessary intervention here, 
being mentioned first and by many participants was the life-
saving steroid interventions used to address salt-wasting 
CAH in infancy. Second, the continuum was not symmetri-
cal but marked (Horn, 2001), as the nonessential pole had 
no equivalently common or readily accessible anchor, and 
its meaning was sometimes reconstructed; “. . . it may be a 
functional choice,” or relabeled (as “interventions that are 
helpful for the overall management of the family” for exam-
ple). The definition of what medical necessity is seems far 
clearer and more coherent than the definition of what it is 
not. Third, while expert medical consensus favors clear and 
precise referential language in this domain (Lee et al., 
2006), interviewees had clear preferences for vagueness in 
some areas. It was particularly difficult to specify what cog-
nates of the word “function” mean, as they sometimes 
seemed to be discrete ways of talking about physical excre-
tion or sexual practices, and sometimes seemed to refer to 
psychosocial experiences more loosely attached to those 
physical processes. Finally, interventions targeting the 
breast, cloaca, or urethra were mentioned too rarely to allow 
detailed analysis.
Analysis
Is Hypospadias Repair Necessary on a Desert 
Island?
The urethral opening of a hypospadic penis is located along 
the underside and not at the tip, and hypospadias are rou-
tinely “repaired” by surgery to “normalize” appearance and 
allow boys to control urinary stream (Lee et al., 2006). 
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Hypospadias surgeries were mentioned by over 60% of 
interviewees (see Table 1), reflecting Karkazis (2008, 
p. 144) description of them as the “bread and butter” work 
of DSD surgical teams. As described elsewhere, interview-
ees were aware that hypospadias surgeries were somewhat 
controversial, and pointed to a lack of personal experience 
with their own patients’ postsurgical regret (Roen & 
Hegarty, 2018). Variance in locating these interventions 
on the continuum was large, partially as a function of a 
commonly evoked distinction between “mild” or “distal” 
hypospadias occurring closer to the tip of a penis and 
“severe” or “proximal” hypospadias occurring closer to or 
at the scrotum. Interventions on the latter were always 
deemed more essential.
In addition, health care professionals’ constructions of 
the essential or nonessential character of these interventions 
prompted several of them to project forward what the social 
environment of young boys with untreated hypospadias 
might be. One urologist voiced the traditional view that 
hypospadias surgery was necessary to
give the young person an opportunity to, you know, particularly 
as a boy to, you know, be continent to not least stand up at the 
urinal with his pals and pee in the pot at the same time.
The idea that hypospadias surgery is particularly necessary 
for psychologically healthy boyhood because all boys must 
be able to urinate standing up, is long-standing in pediatric 
urology (Griffiths, 2018a). Informed by the possibility of 
such stigmatization in childhood, contemporary bioethical 
opinion describes hypospadias intervention as an inter-
vention that might particularly pit the benefits of a stigma-
free childhood against risks to sexual sensation for adults 
(Wiesemann et al., 2010). While these risks to children have 
been mentioned in the medical literature since the 1920s 
(Reis, 2009), no developmental psychological studies evi-
dence the risk of stigma from untreated hypospadias. Risks 
to adult men from iatrogenic effects of surgery were not 
mentioned; participants called to mind sexual behavior only 
in regard to “where the semen has to go” and never in regard 
to risks to sexually sensate tissue. Some health care provid-
ers clearly rejected the inherited view in pediatric urology 
regarding the risk of teasing in the toilet:
the reality is that doesn’t happen, because children these days 
do not look at other people’s, other children’s penises, they just 
don’t do that. So, I’m not sure whether it’s medically essential.
Finally, empathy with parents’ anxiety and distress about 
the risks of stigma, even in the absence of any evidence of 
its likelihood, can impact clinicians. As another urologist 
put it: “in some cases the boy is not all that concerned, 
but the father is.” Elsewhere in the interviews, some health 
care professionals, notably clinical psychologists, reported 
responding to these parents’ concerns by framing the refusal 
of surgery as actively “waiting” rather than “doing nothing” 
(Roen & Hegarty, 2018). This urologist described the non-
necessity of this intervention as follows:
If you lived on a desert island um, hypospadias would be 
perfectly compatible with normal survival. So um, I, I think 
one would have to start with the idea that all hypospadias 
surgery is cosmetic.
Desert islands have anchored western people’s imagination 
of stories of individuals living in cultural isolation for cen-
turies (see e.g., Defoe, 1719). Here, the image supports the 
logical conclusion that since hypospadias repair is “only 
cultural” that intervention on it is not essential. This fram-
ing is consistent with a human rights perspective that hypo-
spadias surgery is conducted for such socially normalizing 
reasons. Such rationales were variously endorsed and 
rejected by health care professionals and used in combina-
tion with descriptions of variation in penile anatomy to 
draw the line around what might be “medically essential” 
here.
Clitoral Surgery: “I Can Hear Some of What 
They Are Saying.”
46 XX karyotype children with CAH are more often born 
with fused labia and/or a larger than typical clitoris (Lee 
et al., 2006). Talk about these anatomical sites and talk 
about these diagnostic groups overlapped considerably. 
About half of the participants mentioned interventions that 
targeted the labia and the clitoris and they were located 
more toward the nonessential pole of the continuum than 
interventions targeting all other anatomical sites (M = 26.5, 
see Table 1). Health care professionals voiced more explicit 
awareness of the controversial nature of surgical interven-
tions when discussing interventions that targeted the labia 
and the clitoris than when discussing hypospadias surgery. 
One participant mentioned an advocacy group and said, 
“I can hear some of what they are saying.” At times, oppo-
sition to these medical interventions led some health care 
professionals to name harmful effects and to attribute them 
to parents:
I’ve been to some meetings where girls are talking about 
having a clitoris that’s been mutilated. To think that it’s mums 
(or dad’s) poor compliance [with medication intended to curb 
clitoral growth] that’s sending us into that. I think there is a role 
here for child protection.
In other parts of the interviews, clinicians described the 
need to remain flexible to manage dilemmas between his-
torically inherited norms for intervention and challenges to 
those interventions (Liao et al., 2019). When these interven-
tions were placed closer to the medically necessary pole, 
their location was justified on similar grounds to arguments 
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for hypospadias surgery; concern that the child would not 
cope in school, particularly if anatomic variation was 
deemed to be “severe,” and parental concern about such 
possibilities. Health care professionals also drew inferences 
about children and parents’ variable capacity for “coping” 
to infer when clitoral reduction, however undesirable, 
remained worth doing:
clitoral reduction in child is purely for cosmetic reasons and to 
keep parents happy really. Actually. But also it’s you know how 
does that child cope with school and all that sort of stuff?
One participant who opposed such surgeries described them 
as not on my planet. This was accompanied by an appeal to 
health economics, and prioritizing demands within a social-
ized health care system according to principles of distribu-
tive justice.
In conclusion, health care professionals were far more 
aware of the controversial nature of clitoral and labial inter-
ventions than others, but still used personal experience with 
particular patients to argue why such interventions might 
approach necessity, for well-intentioned reasons, in some 
“severe” cases. In the larger interview contexts, discussions 
of these interventions suggested the possibility of pluralistic 
ignorance (Prentice & Miller, 1996), as all health care pro-
fessionals suggested that their own DSD teams had become 
more conservative in regard to these surgeries than was the 
norm in medical practice (Liao et al., 2019, p. 3). As the 
next themes show, participants’ understandings of where 
the professional norm lies for any given intervention could 
be very debatable.
Sexuality, Identity, and Fertility: “Do You Need a 
Vagina for Medical Reasons?”
Vaginal agenesis is associated with complete androgen 
insensitivity syndrome (CAIS) and Mayer–Rokitansky–
Küster–Hauser (MRKH) syndrome. Common vaginal con-
struction interventions include irreversible surgery and 
dilation regimes, with the latter being preferred as the first 
approach in many European countries. Surgery on adoles-
cents and adults carries risks, and dilation can be painful, 
effortful, and prolonged (Liao et al., 2011). These interven-
tions are not life-saving but aim to support identity, sexual-
ity, and fertility in adults (Lee et al., 2006). In our analysis 
of the larger interviews, we found health care professionals 
to be aware of pressure on women to “normalize” their 
vaginas, and the distress that normative ideas of woman-
hood can bring about for women with androgen insensitiv-
ity syndrome (AIS) have long been known to qualitative 
psychologists (Alderson et al., 2004). Also, and in contrast 
to the last two themes, health care professionals voiced 
far more explicit awareness that the interventions that 
they might offer in regard to vaginal agenesis would place 
an additional demand on patients’ ability to “cope.” 
Accordingly, health care professionals discussed how some 
psychological preparedness would be required before the 
demanding dilation regimes could begin.
Health care professionals were more discriminating 
between specific vaginal interventions than in all other 
areas when drawing the line; the nine who described vagi-
nal construction made, on average 2.67 distinct marks on 
the line, in contrast to 1.71 marks for interventions on the 
penis and scrotum, and 1.36 marks for interventions on the 
clitoris and labia (see Table 1). Discriminating more finely 
between interventions did not lead to simple stable conclu-
sions about where to draw the line. Rather, speech disfluen-
cies, such as “uhs” and “ums,” were particularly common in 
explaining where vaginal interventions might fall along the 
continuum. Health care professionals also more often com-
mented on their difficulty of explaining their answers here. 
They voiced awareness that medicalization of the body was 
an intentional act, that the extent of valid medicalization 
was in doubt, and that the resulting understanding of medi-
cal necessity fell out from the construction of medicaliza-
tion that was chosen. One gynecologist marked distinct 
interventions for vaginal agenesis at six points on the con-
tinuum, but still wondered out loud “Do you need a vagina 
for medical reasons”? They expanded:
That is the question really isn’t it? Most people would argue 
yes t- in ord-1 you know that you know you want to be sexually 
active in order to maintain your general health and things like 
that so I suppose you could then stick vaginal dilators up here 
[locating “vaginal dilators” at point 62 on the continuum] and 
a vaginoplasty if necessary comes somewhere in the middle 
but you would actually you don’t need that . . . not required 
until an adult . . . until sexually active [locating “vaginoplasty—
not required until sexually active” at point 31 on the continuum].
One clinical psychologist made the contingency between 
the “medicalizing” and the consequent “essential” nature 
of intervention explicit by distinguishing between under-
standings of patients as mechanical bodies that might need 
repair, or as bodies with which people may wish to func-
tion sexually:
it depends whether you want to medicalise the body and say 
that they are medically essential because you need to repair the 
body but then they would probably say more they’re for sexual 
functioning.
It was around these interventions where it became most 
apparent that health care professionals needed to choose 
between two different ontologies of their patients’ embodi-
ment to complete the task. In one ontology, which provided 
certainty and stable ground, patients’ embodiment could be 
understood in mechanistic terms. In the other, patients’ bod-
ies were understood as situational and phenomenological, 
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such that sex development was more like a process of 
“embodied becoming” in which physical, psychological, 
and social were mutually interacting and constitutive of 
each other (Roen, 2009). Health care professionals seemed 
most keenly aware that the first ontology could not ground 
their concept of medical necessity, on its own, in regard to 
vaginal interventions. The disparity between these two was 
lessened if patients who requested interventions in a man-
ner consistent with health care professionals’ own opinions 
were called to mind. But even then, other matters might 
trouble the attribution of adult consent to a patient, leaving 
the dilemma of defining medical necessity in play. Such 
troubling factors included patients’ age:
if it’s interventions like dilatation, for example, I guess if it’s 
something that the young person wishes to happen, um, and 
they want to be a sex-, have a sexual life, then I guess, oh it’s 
really difficult.
Or the desire for intervention for psychological reasons 
rather than for heterosexual intercourse:
The, the whole concept of cosmetic then changes once people 
can give informed consent um and um there are people I’ve 
come across who do not want to have a vagina um, there are 
some, there’ve been a few who’ve said, “I never intend to use 
my vagina for intercourse, but I still want to have one because 
it will make me feel more normal.” Um, i-, it may be as simple 
as being able to refer to “my vagina” um.
As the next theme makes clear, when describing interven-
tions on aspects of the body that can be imagined as having 
a causal effect on psychology, different grounds for con-
structing medical necessity emerge.
Managing Risk: Hormones, Gonads, and the 
Category of the “Essential”
In some conditions, a 46, XY child’s gonads may be testicu-
lar, may be undescended, and may co-occur with a female 
gender identity (Lee et al., 2006). In recent decades, the 
“brain gender” hypothesis that fetal androgens organize both 
brain development and external genital anatomy has gained 
influence (Jordan-Young, 2010), and more children with 
intersex traits have been assigned male in recent decades 
(Kolesinka et al., 2014). Gonadectomy without explicit 
consent occurred commonly prior to the 2006 Consensus 
Statement (Preves, 2003). Endocrine interventions and 
interventions on gonads were considered, on average, the 
most essential of the interventions described by participants 
(see Table 1). Here, health professionals commonly voiced 
the traditional justification of gonadectomy by cancer risk, 
rarely qualifying their judgments of that risk by condition, or 
referencing human rights concerns. Beyond the very proto-
typical “medically essential” cortisol interventions to save 
the lives of infants with CAH, interventions on hormones 
and gonads were described as medically essential on grounds 
other than being life-saving. Describing hormone blockers 
for a girl with CAH going through some virilization, one 
geneticist said:
Well, it’s not going to be life threatening but for some people it 
might be essential because it might be absolutely vital that they 
. . . don’t virilize or they have a choice but for other people it is 
down here [further from the medically essential pole], it is an 
intervention that is helping cosmetic appearances . . . so you 
know it is dependent on the disorder that is the problem, a lot 
of these things are dependent on the disorder.
Here, an intervention is described as essential and vital, 
even though it is not going to be life-saving, and what is 
vital is that the body does not virilize. This response makes 
very clear how endocrinology might ground a category of 
seemingly essential interventions that are categorically not 
life-saving, and are common in this area of clinical medi-
cine. Feder (2014) has argued that when intersex character-
istics are conceptualized primarily in terms of their 
inconsistency with gender binary norms, then they may not 
be understood as human tissues with value and integrity. As 
Dreger (2000, p. 1) notes, citing Canguilhem, the phenom-
enology of normativity is such that the exception appears to 
consciousness long before the norm from which it deviates 
comes into view. In this study, less normative embodiment 
seems to call for a “vital” intervention, while the norm of 
embodiment to which intervention orients goes without 
saying. Although the proposed intervention has clear benev-
olent intent, the grounding of that benevolent intent in nor-
mative understandings is less explicit.
This understanding can be bolstered by appeal to an 
understanding of the patient either as a body or as a person. 
This geneticist qualified their judgment with appeal to med-
ical classification; it is dependent on the disorder that is the 
problem. In contrast, a psychologist resolved the dilemma 
via an understanding of medical necessity that recognized 
the psychological impact of intervention on the individual:
So I think things like pubertal induction I think I would 
generally say, yes, they’re around cosmetic and appearance 
related issues and should we really be, um, intervening with 
that? But at the same time I kind of feel in terms of 
psychologically, um, the impact, kind of feel like I would fall 
more on this side ever so slightly.
After 2006, some clinics delayed some gonadectomies to 
allow spontaneous pubertal development and to avoid the 
need for hormonal replacement (Allen, 2009). As with vagi-
nal surgery, adult patients’ own wishes informed health care 
professionals’ judgments about when gonadectomy was 
medically necessary. But while they often oriented to 
patients who wanted interventions more than was medically 
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normative, here they described dilemmas and discomfort 
arising from patients refusing interventions that were medi-
cally possible:
Now increasingly I understand, that more and more of these 
ladies are choosing not to have their gonads removed, which is 
putting health professionals now in a difficult dilemma. 
Because they feel they want to re-, they need to be removed, 
they’re leaving them to let the individual decide and then the 
individuals have decided to do something opposite of what 
they feel should be done. Well then you’ve given them that 
choice and you need to respect their decision.
We next draw together these findings to reach conclusions 
for general psychology.
Conclusions
Like the human rights documents that critique them, the 
DSD professionals interviewed here can call to mind clear-
cut examples of particularly essential interventions, 
understand that cosmetic, appearance-based interventions 
conducted only for socially normalizing reasons are not 
legitimate, and remain vexed by ambiguous cases where it 
seems less clear whether people with intersex characteris-
tics should be conceptualized primarily as bodies, psycho-
logical subjects or rational choice-makers. Health care 
professionals sometimes draw lines between interventions 
on grounds of anatomical variation alone. But they also 
often find it necessary to draw on a more phenomenological 
ontology in which bodies are situations that human subjects 
experience. These participants were sometime aware that 
they did not operate on a “desert island” but in a context 
sometimes characterized by a dubious received wisdom 
about interventions, collective opposition to medicaliza-
tion, parental anxiety, health care economics, the state’s role 
in child protection, and patients’ powers to make choices to 
demand or refuse particular interventions.
Our demand to “draw the line” around medical necessity 
presented these DSD health care professionals with “a dif-
ficult dilemma” (Billig et al., 1988). However, drawing the 
continuous line for this task allowed them more room for 
ambiguity than does the binary classification of interven-
tions emerging in human rights and legal documents. A use-
ful conceptual distinction between human rights framings 
and the clinical expertise described here is offered in a 
recent statement on bodily integrity in regard to infant geni-
tal surgeries. The Brussels Collaboration on Bodily Integrity 
(2019) distinguishes what is “medically beneficial” on the 
balance of harms and benefits from what is “medically nec-
essary” on the grounds of being life-saving. This study has 
shown how DSD health care professionals have flexible, 
consistent, and practiced ways of stretching the latter cate-
gory of interventions to address the former, by grounding 
their understandings of benevolent action in psychosocial 
concerns. Medical expertise might be characterized by an 
illusion of explanatory depth (Hampton, 2010) that relies on 
norms to an extent that is not always clear to those who 
voice the expertise. As a result, current practices can be 
explained as if they refer to clear categorical differences 
when that is not really the case.
This observation, that DSD professionals may not 
explicitly understand what they are doing in regard to social 
norms or human rights, is not new (see also Kessler, 1990; 
Karkazis, 2008; Human Rights Watch, 2017). Nor is it sur-
prising, considering that surgeries on infants’ intersex char-
acteristics, have, from John Money’s work onward, been 
warranted by humanistic concerns grounded in untested 
optimism about what medical interventions can achieve 
(Morland, 2015). Current human rights movements force 
health care professionals to argue for medical practices that 
once seemed reasonable to presume. In this more contested 
context, arguments may seem grounded in “personal opin-
ion” (as with hypospadias here), harms blamed on parents 
(as with clitoral surgeries here), of unclear value (as with 
vaginal interventions here) or grounded in a not-yet refuted 
medical specialism such as endocrinology. To convince, 
such arguments often project narratives in which psychol-
ogy may figure as centrally as anatomy. As Timmermans 
et al. (2018) put it, such arguments about the future life of a 
patient rather than their current status may be person-
focused without being infant-focused. In the context of such 
narratives, human rights demands to retreat medicine to the 
strictly “medically necessary” or to that which adult patients 
freely choose may seem like flawed attempts to withdraw 
social support offered by the only professionals entrusted 
with responsibility to support the care and flourishing of 
people with intersex characteristics and their families.
It would seem then that people with intersex characteris-
tics might be offered more diverse forms of social support, 
which legal prohibitions on some interventions will not pro-
vide on their own (Ni Mhuirthile, 2010). Recognizing that 
human rights and children’s rights particularly depend upon 
how we imagine nurturing relationships with adults points 
to the question of what psychologists can do, in the most 
general sense, that might support people with intersex char-
acteristics, their families and the over-reaching health care 
providers whose interactions are such a cause for concern. 
The under-application of psychology is matched only by the 
overreach of medicine to psychological matters in these 
interviews. Since 2006, a plethora of smaller qualitative 
psychology studies have contributed clear answers about 
how the social organization of health care can be made 
more humane and less shaming, in this area (Roen, 2019). 
These studies are but one sign of how—since John Money’s 
pivotal writings of the mid-20th century—psychological 
science has vastly expanded its understandings in ways 
that might be conducive to demedicalizing intersex. For 
example, psychologists have developed understandings of 
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the bounded rationality achieved by multidisciplinary medi-
cal teams (Meehl, 1973), children’s ecological contexts 
(Bronfenbrenner, 1979), how people cope actively in 
response to threats of social stigma (Crocker & Major, 
1989), how to conceptualize the difference between profes-
sional and lay understandings of concepts (Kelley, 1992), 
the resolution of ideological dilemmas, including health 
care dilemmas through common sense reasoning (Billig 
et al., 1988), how projections of social norms onto children 
inform the concept of “development” (Burman, 1994), and 
how heteronormative and cisgenderist assumptions operate 
in psychological science (Hegarty, 2018).
Aspects of epistemological violence such as the denial 
of a voice in shaping research questions, and instrumental-
izing research about nature/nurture issues that tends to 
“other” may be material to this late application of psychol-
ogy’s usual enthusiasm for humanistic projects grounded 
in science (Teo, 2010). Rather than blaming bad medicine 
that over-reaches, we psychologists might reflect on our 
own positions and the historic neglect of people with inter-
sex characteristics, qua people, in our own field, which has 
been material to medicine’s over-reaching. It is not ade-
quate to delegate this responsibility to clinical psycholo-
gists within DSD teams, such as those sampled here, who 
inhabit an ambiguous and treacherous institutional context. 
Clinical psychologists may face dilemmas between their 
professional understanding of psychosocial needs and the 
organization of health care in which they find themselves. 
Elsewhere in the SENS interviews, DSD medical profes-
sionals showed an understanding of psychology as most 
relevant to patient care when patients or parents were 
already in distress, and sometimes in distress that was a 
consequence of interactions with other DSD team mem-
bers (Liao & Roen, 2019). In other studies based on the 
SENS data set, clinical psychologists reframe medical 
necessity by creatively reframing waiting on making deci-
sions as a way of “doing something” (Roen & Hegarty, 
2018; c.f, Roen, 2008). In the face of highly variable 
personal opinions among clinical colleagues, the dynamic 
of culpability and complicity with medical intervention is 
likely to characterize clinical psychology in this area (see 
Peck & Feder, 2017). The urge to “do something” in the 
clinic may, in part, be a result of other psychologists doing 
very little, for a long time, in any other respect to impact 
this medicalized population. Psychologists have not yet 
conceptualized clearly enough the flourishing of people 
with intersex characteristics and their family members, nor 
have we adequately understood the dynamics among com-
munities, societies, and legal and health care frameworks 
upon which that flourishing might rely.
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